Concerns have been raised about the implications of genetics for insurance and care costs, both from the public's and the insurance industry's points of view. Insurers worry that applicants might have increasingly precise knowledge of their own risks, which will lead to adverse selection. Public worries focus on the creation of a "genetic underclass" that cannot get access to insurance or essential services. The most striking feature about this, often heated, debate is the almost total absence of numerical estimates of the cost implications.
The Basis of Private, Voluntary Insurance
The prudent conduct of insurance business depends very much on whether people have to buy it, or want to buy it. Since people are generally averse to spending money on intangibles like insurance, one might suspect that those most eager to buy it have reason to believe that they will be claiming sooner rather than later. The problem faced by the insurer is that it might charge for insurance assuming that it faces average risks, but then find that those who choose to buy insurance are in fact riskier than average. This is called adverse selection.
By 'average risks' above, we mean that the group of people who have insurance, known as the risk pool, are a representative cross-section of the whole population. So, a motor insurer might suppose that its risk pool contains a representative selection of sports cars, family saloons, young drivers, old drivers, good drivers and bad drivers, and work out an average premium to charge everybody. Such a system might even work, if the government insisted (a) that all drivers should buy the same quantum of insurance; and (b) that all insurers should offer the same premiums to all drivers.But as soon as either the drivers or the insurers are given an element of choice, this solidarity approach is shattered. The first insurer to realise that young drivers make more claims than middle-aged drivers can charge more to the former and less to the latter, and if other insurers do not follow suit, competition will soon ensure that its risk pool contains all the middle-aged drivers. Other insurers will be forced to follow suit, since they will discover that they have been landed with all the expensive younger drivers, whom they are under-charging. As well as making losses, their existing policyholders will be put at risk, since the insurer may become insolvent.
The example above is slightly exaggerated, but accurate in principle. To control adverse selection, insurers employ underwriters, who gather information about each applicant for insurance, assess the risks and charge a premium accordingly. Those deemed to be at higher risk may be asked to pay a higher premium. Thus, younger drivers pay more than middle-aged drivers for motor insurance, residents of much-burgled areas pay more than others for house insurance, and so on. Sometimes, insurance cannot be obtained at any cost.
As part of the underwriting process, the applicant will be asked to disclose any information that may be relevant to the risk. Clearly, if the applicant could withold relevant information, the insurer would be unable to assess the risk accurately.
By definition, underwriting leads to discrimination; its very purpose is to allow the insurer to discriminate between different risks. Sometimes this is controversial, especially when the insurance has a social or welfare purpose, such as life, health and long-term care (LTC) insurance. In these cases, also, the nature of the information being disclosed is highly personal, and issues of privacy arise. We can pick out sex and disability as past examples of battlegrounds over which insurers and others have fought, and now we can add genetic testing to these.
Even where discrimination on the basis of sex or disability is outlawed, private insurance is often exempted. The principle that underwriting is needed to control adverse selection has, so far, been accepted by legislators almost everywhere. It is not solely that insurers' profits are being protected, but that large, stable risk pools should continue to exist, that those needing insurance can join. Deliberately to admit a group of people to the risk pool at less than cost would, at best, result in a small increase in premiums for everyone or, at worst, lead to strong adverse selection and destabilise the system. The former is arguably similar to the provision of a subsidy through taxation, though the tax is borne only by the insured population. At a modest level, it might be tolerated, and in any case underwriting is not an exact science so there must be cross-subsidies within the risk pool. The latter is neither tolerable nor desirable, unless one argues that nobody may have insurance unless everybody may have insurance. The outcome in any particular case will depend on the circumstances.
A Brief Look at Human Genetics
See Pasternak (1999) or Strachan & Read (1999) for a proper account of human genetics.
To a first approximation, we may say that genes are functional units of DNA, residing on chromosomes in every cell nucleus, that encode the production of a protein or other molecule. These, the 'gene products', may form part of the actual structure of a cell, or they may participate in biochemical processes. These processes, called 'pathways', are often of enormous complexity, depending on large numbers of genes for precise control.
All 'adult' cells contain two copies of every gene (except those on the X and Y chromosomes; we ignore this complication here). However, each sex cell (sperm or egg) contains only one copy, so that when they fuse to become the progenitor cell of a child, that cell has a full complement of genes that is a mixture of those from each parental line. Since the adult organism develops entirely by cell division, starting from that single fertilized egg, every adult (or 'somatic') cell contains an identical set of genes.
DNA, with its famous double helix structure, is an extremely stable molecule, but when it has to be copied (either during cell division or when producing a sex cell) the double helix is unzipped into two strands, a copy is made of each, and the originals and copies are zipped up again into a pair of double helices. This requires many billions of individual DNA bases to be copied, and errors do occur. The cell has many very efficient DNA repair mechanisms (themselves complex genetic pathways) but they sometimes fail, and a mutation arises. Mutations can also be caused by chemical or radioactive damage to DNA.
The effect of a mutation depends on when it occurs, and what happens to the gene product. (a) If it occurs during cell division in the foetus, it will be propagated through parts of the organism; all cells derived from the mutated cell will carry the same mutation.
If it occurs during cell division in an adult (a 'somatic mutation'), its effect will be more local, possibly confined to tissues in which that gene is expressed. If, however, it happens during the production of a sex cell, it may be passed to offspring, and hence hereditary diseases arise. Of course, some mutations may also be beneficial. (b) A mutated gene will encode an altered gene product, which may still be capable of participating in its biochemical pathway, but in a different way, or it may be nonfunctional, or it may actually be harmful. If it is non-functional, all may be well as long as only one mutated gene was inherited; the 'normal' copy inherited from one parent may be able to provide enough working gene product. If two mutations are inherited, however, the pathway may break down, leading to disease. This is how recessive disorders arise. If the product of the mutated gene is harmful, inheriting one mutation from one parent will cause disease. This is how dominant disorders arise.
Many genes have several different functional versions, called 'alleles', that persist in the population. Often these lead to very slight changes in a pathway, often in combination with particular alleles of other genes, and often depending on environment and lifestyle too. The term for this kind of complex process, if it increases susceptibility to some disease, is 'multifactorial disorder'. The common causes of death, such as heart disease and cancer, may be influenced by very many multifactorial disorders, most perhaps causing a modest increase in mortality or morbidity risk. The genetical problem of identifying multifactorial disorders is formidable; it depends on setting up huge population-based databases, which is only just beginning to be done. The statistical problem of quantifying the extra risks is even more formidable.
For our purpose, therefore, we can identify a small number of single-gene dominant disorders of potential relevance to insurance. The number is small because mutation carriers have to remain asymptomatic at least until early adulthood, which is quite uncommon. These are all known to medical science already, because they have been observed in families for a long time. Few of these conditions can be successfully treated. At the other end of the scale, we can identify a large number of multifactorial disorders, mostly yet to be discovered, and of relatively modest effect. It may be hoped that many of these may be treatable, or at least that some extra risk may be offset by changes in lifestyle or diet.
Considering care costs in general, genetics could have more profound implications. The future of pharmaceuticals, at least in the affluent West, will lie in the development of drugs targetted on genotypes. Currently, many drugs are ineffective for a large proportion of people, and harmful to some; the reason is genetical. Much of medical care, therefore, may become a branch of applied genetics, leading to costs that are hard to foresee. Genetics may play a large part in ageing, and therefore in when long-term care is needed. This is the question we will consider in this paper.
Human Genetics and Insurance
Genetics has always featured in underwriting, because family history has long been recognised as relevant information. What is new is the advent of direct testing of DNA. Compared with other medical tests that may be carried out on an asymptomatic person, genetic tests appear to offer extraordinary precision. The impression that has taken hold in some quarters is that a battery of genetic tests carried out at a young age will yield a printout of what diseases a person will suffer, and when, and the date and cause of death. Armed with this information, an insurer will be able to tailor the insurance cover of every individual, naturally to their own advantage. People with 'good' genes will get cheap insurance they are unlikely to need, while those with 'bad' genes will become a genetic underclass, unable to obtain or afford insurance that the definitely do need.
The fact that this simple scenario is ludicrously unlikely has not stopped its progress through much of the media. Perhaps one reason for this is the behaviour of insurers in the past, which has not exactly elevated them to a position of public trust. Quite apart from their exemptions from anti-discrimination legislation, which is anathema to some, they acquired (or were given) a very poor reputation for their handling of AIDS in the 1980s, and subsequently. Particular examples were refusing to insure people who had had an HIV test with a clear result, and intrusive questioning about sexuality. There is no doubt that the industry was rattled by the emergence of AIDS, and in the early days adopted some practices that it later dropped. In fact, more orderly conduct was quite soon restored, but the idea was created that this was how insurers would always try to behave unless restrained from doing so. In the U.K., we have also had a pensions misselling scandal, and a few other scandals might be in the pipeline, so it is not surprising that insurers' involvement in anything can arouse immediate and deep suspicion.
However, it is not necessary to trust insurers to be able to say that the scenario above is unlikely; it is only necessary to consider the actuarial implications of genetic test information. Little quantitative research into this has yet been done, and that seems to be one of the main sources of heat rather than light in the debate. Macdonald (1997 Macdonald ( , 1999 ) used a Markov model to represent genetic heterogeneity, and reached some general conclusions about life insurance underwriting. We shall see some examples from this, by way of introducing models for adverse selection. Later work has concentrated on measuring the impact of specific genes, including Lemaire et al. (2000) , , Macdonald, Waters & Wekwete (2003a , 2003b , Pokorski & Ohlmer (2000) on the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes linked to familial breast and ovarian cancer; Smith (1998) on Huntington's disease; and Macdonald & Pritchard (2000 , 2001 and Warren et al. (1999) on Alzheimer's disease. Surprisingly, this short list includes most of the quantitative financial work on genetics and insurance.
Without any numbers or estimates of costs, insurers can only point to the risk of adverse selection, and say they must be allowed to know everything that the applicant knows. Leigh (1996) is a good example of such advocacy. Likewise without any numbers, those who oppose disclosing genetic test results to insurers cannot say whether or not this is workable. The argument proceeds without taking notice of the magnitude of the problem.
The current position in the U.K. is that the Government has set up the Genetics and Insurance Committee (GAIC), in response to a report by the Human Genetics Advisory Commission (HGAC) which will consider requests from the insurance industry to be allowed to use genetic test information in underwriting. However, the Human Genetics Commission (HGC, the successor to the HGAC) has re-opened the discussion (HGC, 2002) and has proposed an extended rôle for GAIC, and a broadening of what is regarded as 'genetic information' such as family history.
Although the models we discuss here have their roots in questions of insurance, they may also yield useful insights into the costs of any other product or service for which demand might depend on some genetic factors.
Actuarial Models for Genetics and Insurance

A Multiple-State Model
The key features of actuarial models are (a) that they are probabilistic models of 'life events', such as death, falling ill, recovering from illness and so on; and (b) that they incorporate payments, either when a given event occurs (such as death) or as long as a specific event does not occur (such as a pension payable until death). Their usual applications are to relatively simple insurance problems, but they are extremely flexible and ideal for addressing the financial consequences of genetics. sitions between the states. The transitions take place at random times (this is the probabilistic basis of the model) governed by the transition intensities (also called hazard rates or forces) denoted µ ijk x+t in the diagram. By choosing these intensities appropriately, the times or ages at which events take place can be made to reflect realistic life histories. Note that in insurance practice, the age at which someone buys insurance is most often denoted x, and we use the elapsed duration t to represent the passage of time; that is why the intensities have x + t as parameter.
If the data allow, it is convenient to assume that the model is Markov; that is, that the probabilities of future events depend only on the state currently occupied. This is indicated in Figure 1 by the transition intensities being functions of age only.
The Appendix gives a brief technical account of how such models translate into actuarial practice. In this model, during sojourns in each insured state payments are made continuously, which can represent the payment of insurance premiums. Associated with each transition from an insured state to the dead state are one-off payments, representing the death benefit under a life insurance policy. So in this model, a person starts without having had a genetic test, and without life insurance. They might then buy life insurance without having a genetic test, or they might have a genetic test and then decide whether to buy life insurance. So this is a model of a person's actions in an insurance market rather than the history of someone who has already bought a policy. Similar models can be specified to represent many other kinds of insurance, for example health or long-term care insurance. 
Heterogeneity
The model shown in Figure 1 does not allow for heterogeneity. To bring that in, we divide the population into sub-populations, each assumed to be homogeneous, and each of these is represented by one of the models from Figure 1 . Figure 2 gives a very simple example, in which the two populations have mortality that is slightly below or slightly above the average, respectively. This is a very simple way to represent the 'Ordinary Rates' (OR) class in life insurance.
A surprising feature of life insurance practice in Europe is that insurers do not, in fact, seek to identify very fine categories of risk. Instead, about 95% of applicants are insured at the same basic rate, called the Ordinary Rate, which varies only by sex and smoking status. It follows that this population includes some lives whose mortality risk is slightly higher than average, perhaps up to 130% or 150% relative risk. Only when the relative risk exceeds about 150% would an insurer start to charge extra premiums, and only at relative risks of 400% or so would no insurance be offered (Leigh, 1990) . The model used here is perhaps the simplest representation of heterogeneity within the OR class.
Genetic risk is not explicitly represented here; that is because the genetic disorders most relevent to the OR group are likely to be multifactorial in nature. However, given the likely modest increased risk implied by a multifactorial disorder (all of us probably carry several multifactorial disorders) we may suppose that the low-mortality group has a low probability that a genetic test has a positive (adverse) result, while the high-probability group has a higher probability that a genetic test has a positive result. This simple model captures most aspects of the problem: (a) We may model the possibility that people who discover that they have a disorder might be more likely to buy life insurance, or might insure their live for higher amounts. (b) The rate at which insurance is bought after having had a genetic test can also vary to represent the insurer's use of genetic test data in underwriting. (c) The rate at which genetic testing takes place might be low, which would represent testing in a clinical setting only, or high, to represent population screening. In principle, the number of sub-populations can be expanded to reflect as much as is known about the genetic heterogeneity; one sub-population for each known mutation for example. In practice, both computing capacity and data limitations will enforce a broader approach; the estimation of the hazard rates in the model requires quite substantial amounts of data, especially because they must be age-dependent.
The (Macdonald, 1997 (Macdonald, , 1999 ) used a form of 'stress-testing' in which deliberately extreme assumptions were made about the prevalence of genetic testing, the additional mortality associated with a revealed mutation, and the level of adverse selection. All these were supposed to be loaded very much against the insurer, who was not allowed access to the genetic test results. The assumptions made were all intended to be far worse than is likely in reality. Note that the model was not based on any specific gene or genes; it assumed simply that increased mortality risk was associated in an unspecified way with genetic conditions that a test would reveal. Tables 1 and 2 show the percentage increases in premiums that would result in two cases: (a) Table 1 is based on the model of the 'Ordinary Rates' (OR) class in Figure 2 . In the high-mortality sub-population, extremely high transition intensities were assumed for the incidence of genetic testing (0.25, with 20% of tests being positive), and of insurance purchase after a positive result (1.0). (b) Table 2 uses a model with three sub-populations: one including 94% of the population, with 81.2% of average mortality; one including 5% of the population, with 206% of average mortality; and one including 1% of the population, with 490% of average mortality. The higher the mortality risk, the higher the probability that a genetic test gives a positive result. The high-risk sub-populations crudely represent greatly increased risk because of single-gene disorders, though without specifying any Grys (1997) , and represent the three insurance classes (those charged OR, those charged higher premiums and those declined).
The tables show the percentage increases in premiums for lives starting out without insurance, and before genetic testing, at ages 30, 40 and 50, for different policy terms, assuming insurers do not have access to genetic test results, and that 'adverse selectors' opt for sums assured 1, 2 or 4 times the average sum assured.
Remembering the extremity of the assumptions, we conclude that: (a) freedom to choose higher sums assured is the most costly part of adverse selection, and it would seem reasonable to allow genetic test information to be disclosed if a high sum assured is sought; (b) if high sums assured are excluded, 10% seems to be an upper limit (probably a considerable overestimate) for any premium increases needed because insurers do not know genetic test results; and (c) multifactorial disorders are unlikely to be of much significance for life insurance underwriting.
Some rare cases might fall outside the scope of these general conclusions, for example Huntington's Disease, but these are already underwritten on the basis of family history. A few highly-penetrant single-gene oncogenes might also present more precise risks than the model assumes, but it is too soon to say that the impact on life insurance will be significant. In general, genetic test information will only will only disadvantage the insurer if: (a) the results of a test need not be disclosed; (b) the possibility that the condition being tested for is present cannot be deduced from other information, for example family history; (c) the additional mortality risk indicated by the test is larger than the (quite broad) increments in risk used in underwriting; and (d) there is no treatment or advice that can be given to improve the prospects of someone who tests positive.
If we can suppose that genetic testing will be carried out for clinical reasons, and not merely out of curiosity, the likelihood of many genetic tests being a danger to life insurers diminishes greatly.
We conclude by noting that life insurance is a large, mature market, which can absorb a relatively small amount of adverse selection. This is not true of the markets for health and long-term care insurance, and it is possible that the conclusions in respect of them would be different. A recent study into long-term care insurance, Alzheimer's Disease and the ApoE gene is Macdonald & Pritchard (2000 , 2001 , and in the remainder of the paper we discuss that model.
A Model of Alzheimer's Disease
Alzheimer's Disease and the ApoE Gene
Alzheimer's disease (AD) is a progressive, degenerative disease of the neurones (brain cells) leading to loss of memory and of ability to carry out activities of daily living. It is quite common among the elderly; its prevalence at age 90 may be 30% or higher. It accounts for a high proportion of long-term care (LTC) costs.
The vast majority of AD occurs at ages over 60, but in certain families it strikes at much younger ages, so-called early-onset AD (EOAD). Three dominantly inherited genes are known that cause EOAD (Presenilin-1, Presenilin-2 and Amyloid Precursor Protein), and there may be others. A fourth gene -Apolipoprotein E (ApoE) -is known, that does not cause EOAD, but that appears to increase susceptibility to AD earlier within the usual age range (which should not be confused with EOAD; the terminology is unfortunate).
The ApoE gene has three alleles, ε2, ε3 and ε4. Estimates of their frequencies in the population vary, but one of the largest meta-analyses (Farrer et al., 1997 ) estimated them to be about 0.08, 0.78 and 0.14 respectively in Caucasian populations. The ε4 allele is the one associated with earlier onset, in dose-related fashion such that the ε4/ε4 genotype is at more risk than the ε3/ε4 or ε2/ε4 genotypes. The ε2 allele may confer some protection against AD, but its rarity (and the rarity of the ε2/ε4 genotype) make this hard to determine. Figures 3 and 4 show estimates of the age-related additional risk of onset of AD, in the form of odds ratios (see the Appendix) with respect to the commonest genotype ε3/ε3. It is evident that the ε4/ε4 genotype is high risk for both males and females, and the ε3/ε4 genotype for females. Other ε4 genotypes are not unambiguously high risk. Figure 5 shows a Markov model for AD. Each genotype is represented by such a model, except that we combine ε2/ε2 and ε2/ε3, because the former is so rare.
A Model of Alzheimer's Disease
The choice of states and transitions in the model is largely dictated by the events that have been studied in the epidemiological literature, of which onset, diagnosis and institutionalization are the most common. There is likely to be some inconsistency among different studies, since AD is difficult to diagnose with certainty pre-mortem, and conditions for institutionalization will vary from place to place and from time to time.
There is no strong evidence that the progression of AD after onset depends on genotype, or that mortality differs, so the rate of onset µ i12 x+t is in fact the only intensity in the model that depends on genotype. 
Fitting the Transition Intensities
The process of fitting the intensities was described in Macdonald & Pritchard (2000) and we refer the reader to that paper. Two major issues were as follows: (a) The available data were results reported in the medical literature, rather than the raw observations from any study. While less than ideal, it will often be the case that original data will not become available to researchers interested in applications other than clinical studies. A particular problem is that studies tend not to report agerelated incidence rates, but more often prevalence rates or summary statistics such as odds ratios. Of course the estimation of incidence rates is relatively demanding of the data. See the Appendix for a brief discussion. (b) It was reasonably certain that the additional risk associated with ApoE would be overstated, because of the form of the studies included in Farrer et al. (1997) . These were all case-control studies, in which those with AD were included precisely because they had AD. It is likely that prospective population studies would yield lower risk estimates (there is already some evidence for this) but how much lower? We included this by considering excess rates of onset, among ε4 carriers, that were 50% or 25% of those based on Farrer et al. (1997) ; we denote this factor m = 1.0, 0.5 or 0.25 in the following tables. Interpreting this is inevitably speculative, but on balance we prefer lower rather than higher additional risks.
In passing, note that this raises the interesting question of how and why a person might be found to have a genetic predisposition. In some cases, for example the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes associated with familial breast and ovarian cancer, the only reason for its discovery (before symptoms appear) might be referral to a genetics clinic precisely because of a family history. The ApoE gene, however, was first discovered because of the different effects of its alleles on heart disease, leading some to conclude that screening would be beneficial. Then its rôle in AD was discovered, and the benefits of screening became less clear. Opinions differ on whether screening for different kinds of genetic disorder will become widespread, but the ethics of screening in the absence of effective interventions are dubious, and ApoE illustrates the pitfalls. Over-the-counter genetic testing (already available in some cases, from laboratories in the U.S.A.) muddies the waters even further.
Application to Long-Term Care Insurance
LTC insurance, in the U.K., is a tiny market, but it is possible that it could have a larger rôle as part of a combined public/private system. Its size means that it might be particularly vulnerable to adverse selection if it were to grow, but to something well short of comprehensive coverage.
A LTC policy usually has a specified benefit, often indexed, which will be paid if full-time care is required. The criterion for payment is usually cognitive disfunction or inability to perform a number of 'Activities of Daily Living' (ADLs). A typical list of ADLs is washing, dressing, mobility, toiletting, feeding and transferring, and inability to perform three or four might trigger a claim. Some policies will pay a reduced benefit upon failure of fewer ADLs. Note that there is usually a maximum available benefit; since the purpose is to pay for a specific service of reasonable quality, there is no reason to allow benefits much in excess of its cost. Therefore one of the main potential sources of adverse selection, a tendency to buy larger amounts of cover, is absent. Useful references are Dullaway & Elliott (1998) and Humble & Ryan (1998) .
Premiums may be payable regularly or as a lump sum, typically at retirement age. We only consider single premium policies here, bought by healthy individuals. We assume that the force of interest is δ = 0.05, and benefits are indexed at the same rate δ b = 0.05.
The AD model does not represent explicitly the start of a claim under a LTC policy; no insurance data are available. Macdonald & Pritchard (2000) used institutionalization as a proxy for the start of a claim, which probably underestimates claim costs. However, it is simple to substitute a benefit consisting of an annuity payable while institutionalized, plus a lump sum payable on institutionalization, equal to the accumulated benefits that would have been paid had the claim been made some time before institutionalization. This point is not too important for comparing relative costs among ApoE genotypes, but it would matter in practice. Table 3 shows approximate underwriting ratings by genotype for applicants at ages 60, 65, 70 and 75 (from Macdonald & Pritchard (2001) ). The model only gives AD-related costs, in other words, the single premium that would provide for care if AD occurred but not otherwise. Underwriting ratings based on AD-related costs alone will be overstated, since claims arising from other causes will not be much affected by ApoE genotype. Watson (1998) suggested that AD accounted for 25-33% of LTC claim numbers but 40-50% of claim costs (in the U.S.A.) so assuming total claim costs about twice those arising from AD alone may be reasonable; this is reflected in Table 3 . The ratings can be interpreted as the extra premium an applicant would have to pay if his or her ApoE genotype were known by the insurer, and the insurer were allowed to use that information. The 'standard' premium is based on the average across all genotypes calculated from the model. Males and females combined are shown as well as males and females separately (the data for males are sparse). Such ratings are how an insurer would conventionally express excess risk. (a) At high ages the extra premiums are much lower than at age 60, as would be expected from the pattern of odds ratios. (b) The parameter m is very significant; only when m = 1 does the ε3/ε4 genotype present significant risks. For comparison, GAIC originally adopted a threshold of 50% extra risk for life insurance, and 25% extra risk for other kinds of insurance, above which it would permit genetic test results to be used (however, these thresholds may be reviewed following criticism in HGC (2002)). (c) With m = 0.25, regarded as more realistic than m = 1, even the ε4/ε4 genotype would not attract a substantial extra premium.
These conclusions may be of considerable practical interest. One reason is the typical response of the media to the discovery of a new genetic link. Thinking in terms of severe single gene disorders like Huntington's disease, however inappropriate that may be, the creation of yet another 'genetic underclass' is announced. Quantitative work such as this may allow a more reasoned debate to take place, which is especially important when laws and regulations are being considered. Unfortunately, such work follows the Table 4 : Costs of adverse selection for females as a percentage of total LTC insurance costs, with ε2/ε4, ε3/ε4 and ε4/ε4 genotypes 2, 4, 10 or 100 times as likely to insure as low-risk genotypes. , for benefits increasing continuously (δ b = 0.05) and commencing on institutionalisation. Source: Macdonald & Pritchard (2001 epidemiology, which follows the discovery of the gene, which follows the discovery of a familial association; in the case of ApoE and AD, the elapsed time has been about ten years -rather longer than the media are accustomed to. The simple approximation of total LTC costs as a multiple of AD-related LTC costs is crude, and a great improvement has been obtained by Pritchard (2002) , using a model of disability based on ADLs. Macdonald & Pritchard (2001) also looked at the possibility of adverse selection, assuming applicants might know their ApoE genotype but the insurer would not. Since they considered applicants at a fixed age, the cost of adverse selection depends on the proportion of each genotype who apply. The insurer sets premiums as though each genotype were represented in the risk pool as in the population, but the actual costs will depend on how much the high-risk genotypes are, in fact, over-represented. The cost of adverse selection is conveniently expressed as the percentage increase in the premium that everyone would have to pay in order to recover the excess cost. Table 4 (from Macdonald & Pritchard (2001) ) gives some examples, for females where the ε4 carriers are 2, 4, 10 or 100 times as likely to insure as the others, and overall claim costs are twice AD-related costs. Again, the effect of the parameter m is paramount; if m = 0.25, even with high-risk individuals being 100 times as likely to buy insurance (which could only happen in a small market, with a high level of genetic testing) the cost is quite small.
A Simple Model of Care Costs
Holmes et al (1998) surveyed 655 persons diagnosed as having AD, and fitted several regression models to their individual care costs. The most inclusive such model counted the opportunity costs of unpaid carers, and was (per year, in 1997 money) £41,794, plus £436.6 per year since diagnosis, minus £336 for each year of age, plus £17,840 if in an Table 5 : The EPV of AD-related care costs for a healthy person age 60 in 1997, based on the costs model of Holmes et al. (1998) . Source: Lee (1999 institution. Warren et al. (1999) used this payment model, plus a version of the AD model described before, to look at the possible effect of the ApoE gene on overall AD-related LTC costs. A technicality intrudes here. Although the AD model itself is Markov, the costs model includes a term depending on the duration since onset (strictly, diagnosis). The payments are adapted to the natural filtration of the AD model, but they do not share the Markov property of conditional expectations, that all history except the current state can be jettisoned. Warren et al. (1999) got round this difficulty by assuming an average term since diagnosis of 5 years. Lee (1999) removed the approximation (and in doing so found that it was, in fact, quite good) and we base the figures below on her work. Note that these differ slightly (but unimportantly) from the corresponding figures in Warren et al. (1999) for another reason; the latter used a parameterisation of the AD model slightly different from that used by Macdonald & Pritchard (2000) , and Lee (1999) . Table 5 shows the capitalised cost of AD-related care for a healthy person age 60 in 1997, based on the costs model above, with force of interest δ = 0.05 and force of benefit inflation δ b = 0.05. This may be interpreted at the lump-sum cost, on retirement at age 60, of insuring both the retiree and potential carers against the potential costs of AD, whether provided privately or by the state.
The parameter m in Table 5 is especially important. Recall that m = 1 corresponds to the model fitted to the odds ratios observed (or estimated) by Farrer et al. (1997) , while m = 0.25 corresponds to additional risk (excess rate of onset) among ε4 carriers of only 25% of that observed. The latter is likely to give a more plausible idea of the risk conferred by the ε4 allele in the population, even if just an order of magnitude. Observe that: (a) costs for females are much higher than for males (as expected); (b) the heterogeneity of costs is very high with m = 1, but greatly reduced if m = 0.25; (c) the value of m makes only a small difference to the average EPV because the rates of onset in respect of the different genotypes were all adjusted to fit the population rate of onset (for comparison, the EPVs based on the latter were £60,600 for females and £36,500 for males, independent of m; and (d) these are AD-related costs only, and the differences, by genotype, of total LTC costs will be considerably less unless some other causes of infirmity are non-randomly as-sociated with AD.
Based on a crude multiplier of 3 as before, Warren et al. (1999) estimated that with m = 0.25, the additional total care costs faced by someone with the ε4/ε4 genotype might be just over 10% for females, and just under 10% for males. We note, here, that these could be: (a) overestimates, because even m = 0.25 could turn out to be too high; or (b) underestimates, because AD imposes particular burdens on unpaid carers, so even if 3 is an appropriate multiplier for LTC insurance costs, it may be too high for actual costs. Warren et al. (1999) regarded additional costs of 10% as borderline for increased premiums under a LTC insurance contract.
Long-Term Care and Pensions
Pensions and LTC are provided separately in the U.K., largely for historical reasons. This is true both in the private and public sectors; in the latter, for example, different branches of government are responsible for funding the two benefits. It is worthwhile considering the combined costs, since they may to some extent offset each other. Longer lifetimes free of illness increase the cost of a pension but decrease the cost of a LTC policy. The effect of a risk factor such as ApoE genotype on a combined 'retirement package' might therefore be reduced. In this section, we return to the LTC insurance model of Macdonald & Pritchard (2001) to show some examples.
Naturally, the relative magnitude of the two benefits will determine how effectively genetic heterogeneity of costs will be offset, and we note that LTC insurance costs are effectively bounded by the cost of reasonable care, while pensions can be unlimited. However, those with very large pensions will be better able to afford LTC anyway, and it is precisely at the more basic end of the scale that the advantages might lie. Table 6 is based upon a pension of £3,254 per year (indexed at force δ p = 0.03), and a LTC benefit of £9,600 p.a. (indexed at force δ b = 0.05). These were based on the average pension in 1997-97, and the 'typical' LTC benefit in the experience of one major reinsurer. (The lower rate of indexation of the pension simply reflects the difference between price and earnings inflation; in the U.K., pensions are typically linked to prices.)
The table shows the genotype-related costs of two packages, in respect of females only: (a) the pension alone; and (b) the pension payable while not institutionalized with AD, and the LTC benefit while institutionalized with AD.
The very striking outcome is that the differences in cost in respect of the different genotypes are now very small. They are not large for the pension on its own, but even when the LTC benefit is added they remain at a level that is probably negligible for underwriting purposes. We would draw particular attention to the assumption that m = 1 here, so we are assuming genetic heterogeneity as strong as that observed in case-based studies, almost certainly much higher than in the population at large. The LTC costs relate to AD only, so the percentage increase in the cost of the pension will be rather larger when other causes of claim are allowed for (which will reduce the genetic heterogeneity of costs even further).
Conclusions
Advances in human genetics are highlighting potential problems for the provision of funded health and care services, because it appears to offer a new level of predictability at the level of the individual. Actuarial models, based on events in individual lifetimes, are well suited to examining these problems. The main benefit is the injection of some quantitative evidence into what is a heated, and often ill-informed debate.
The examples we have used, namely life insurance in the OR class and AD-related care costs, had conclusions that would surprise many; there was little or no sign of an emerging 'genetic underclass'. In fact this might be the norm, except in the case of a small number of rare single-gene disorders. Perhaps it is because the latter model of genetic disorder has long been visible (in family histories) that newly discovered genetic disorders of a very different kind have tended to be regarded in the same light, however inappropriately. Unfortunately, the long time it may take to proceed from genetic discovery, through epidemiology to quantitative results, means that this good news may be yesterday's news, as far as the media are concerned.
It is also unlikely that all this genetic research will have an adverse impact on morbidity and mortality. Many in the medical profession would like to ensure that genetic testing is only carried out if there is a clinical benefit, including advice on reproduction.
At the time of writing it seems possible that effective treatments for AD may be just over the horizon; if so, there may be interesting questions about medical costs rather than LTC costs that our model could address (though how interesting they would be may depend on how healthcare is funded). This appendix describes briefly the technical features of actuarial models of life histories, and payments depending upon them. Figure 5 gave a example, in which the events in a life history are represented by transitions between a discrete set of states. The simplest such model is a two-state model of mortality, shown in Figure 6 , and this is sufficient for the purposes of demonstration. All of the results here extend immediately to arbitrarily complex models. Figure 6 represents death as a transition between two states, numbered 0 and 1 and representing 'alive' and 'dead', taking place at some random time. The time of death is governed by the transition intensity µ x , also known as the force of mortality or hazard rate, in the sense that for small dx:
Typically, µ x increases rapidly with age. From early middle age to very high ages µ x appears to increase exponentially, so for suitable parameters A and B:
This is the Gompertz law of mortality, dating back to 1825. Though the parameters A and B are different in different populations and in different epochs, this simple law is often a remarkably good fit to real data, except at very low and very high ages where special factors play a part. It is often useful in other settings too, for example in Section 5.3 we used it to represent the rate of onset of AD. In actuarial work we need to place monetary values on payments that depend on the events taking place at random future times. In this case, we could have payments made during sojourns in any state. For example define: P = The rate of payment per annum if alive at age x which could represent premiums payable to the insurer under a life insurance contract. Or we could have lump-sum payments made on a transition, for example defining: S = The sum assured payable immediately on death at age x By convention, payments to the insurer are positive.
A key quantity in all financial work is the present value of a stream of future cashflows. This is their capitalised value at the present time, allowing for the effect of interest. We represent interest by the instantaneous rate of accumulation of a unit amount, denoted δ per annum and defined by the property that over a small time dt, £1 will accumulate to £(1 + δdt).
We do not know the present value of net future cash-flows under a life insurance policy; it is a random variable because premiums cease and the sum assured is paid at the time of death, which in this model is a random variable. However we can find its expected present value or EPV. Because this represents the expected future liability on the part of the insurer, it is the basis of setting aside reserves in life insurance, and is called the prospective policy value, denoted V x if the person is alive at age x. The key result in actuarial mathematics is Thiele's differential equation for V x :
Thiele's equation is easy to interpret; the rate of change of the reserve is given by the rate at which it earns interest, plus the rate at which premiums are paid, less the net cost should the person die. On death, the sum assured must be paid, but the reserve currently being held can be released.
As in Figures 2 and 5 , states and transitions can represent a great variety of events in a life history. Insurance contracts are an obvious area of application, but not the only one; for example payments could represent the costs under any system of healthcare. Each possible transition is governed by a transition intensity exactly like µ x , the EPV of future cash-flows, given the state occupied at age x, can be defined just as V x was, and Thiele's equation becomes a system of differential equations that is always easy to solve numerically, and Norberg (1995) has extended them to a recursive system for higher moments. All the examples given in this paper were obtained by solving Thiele's equations with suitably chosen payments.
The transition intensities, especially those representing onset of illness or death, have to be estimated from observed life histories of people at risk of illness or death. Often, in actuarial work, the original data are not available, and we have to make use of statistics published in the medical literature. The following examples give an idea of what statistics may be useful. (a) Incidence Rates: Incidence rates are exactly the same as transition intensities or hazard rates, therefore ideal. However, we need very detailed life histories to estimate them directly. (b) Penetrance Estimates: The penetrance q(x) of a mutation, as a function of age x, is the probability that it leads to onset of disease by age x in the absence of any competing risks. Incidence rates can be found from penetrance estimates so they are useful, but often all that may be known is the penetrance by some very high age, which yields no information in respect of the ages at which insurance tends to be in force. (c) Prevalence Rates: The prevalence of a disease is the proportion of the study population affected, possibly stratified by age or other risk factor. Incidence rates can sometimes be found from prevalence rates if the structure of the population by age is known, but this is difficult and usually quite speculative. However, prevalences can be estimated from cross-sectional rather than longitudinal studies, so are more easily and cheaply available. (d) Odds Ratios: If a good reference population is available, with well-known incidence rates, the incidence rates in respect of other populations with specific risk factors can be expressed as a function of those of the reference population. Sometimes this is done directly, but often odds ratios are given. If q r (x) is the probability of disease by age x in the reference population, and q(x) the same in another population, the odds in each population are O r = q r (x)/(1 − q r (x)) and O = q(x)/(1 − q(x)) respectively, and the odds ratio is O/O r . As in Section 5.3, these can sometimes be used to estimate incidence rates.
